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Abstract
New Zealand firms exhibit significant variation in the extent to which they formally
involve CEOs in the executive pay-setting process: a considerable number sit on the
compensation committee, while others are excluded from the board altogether. Using
1997-2005 data, we find that CEOs who sit on the compensation committee obtain
generous annual pay rewards that have low sensitivity to poor performance shocks.
By contrast, CEOs who are not board members receive pay increments that have
low mean and high sensitivity to firm performance. Moreover, the greater the pay
increment attributable to CEO involvement in the pay-setting process, the weaker is
subsequent firm performance over one, three- and five-year periods.
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1 Introduction
How important is Chief Executive Officer (CEO) participation in the executive pay-setting
process? For example, CEO membership of the firm’s compensation committee would seem
to represent a significant departure from the ‘arms-length bargaining’ model envisaged
by agency theory, and hence create the potential for opportunistic CEO behaviour. On
the other hand, Jensen et al. (2004) claim that even when not a member, CEOs tend
to be fully involved in most compensation committee discussions. Viewed in this light,
explicit membership of the compensation committee might seem to be of only minor
importance. Similarly, CEOs who are not part of the board of directors would appear
to be in a relatively weak bargaining position when it comes to negotiating their personal
remuneration, but other internal chains of communication may compensate for this lack
of direct influence. An obvious question of interest is whether such formal distinctions
in participation have real consequences for pay outcomes, or whether they simply reflect
titles that lack any significant economic substance. In short, does the extent of formal
CEO involvement in boardroom discussions of executive remuneration influence eventual
pay outcomes?
Any attempt to address this question empirically requires data containing mean-
ingful variation in the extent of formal CEO involvement in the pay-setting process. Such
heterogeneity is not always present: in the United States, for example, CEO board mem-
bership is virtually automatic, while membership of the compensation committee is ex-
tremely rare.1 One country where the required variation in CEO involvement clearly exists
is New Zealand (NZ): CEO membership of the compensation committee is by no means
uncommon in NZ firms while, at the other end of the spectrum, a significant number of
CEOs are excluded from the board altogether. The end result is a setting where the range
of formal CEO involvement in boardroom discussions about pay is wide, thus permitting a
relatively powerful test of the importance of such involvement in the executive pay-setting
process.
1See, for example, Anderson and Bizjak (2003), Klein (1998), Newman and Mozes (1999) and Vafeas
(2003). As a result, most studies (e.g., Anderson and Bizjak; Daily et al., 1998; Newman and Mozes;
Sun and Cahan, 2009) focus on the governance and pay-setting implications of broader measures of
compensation committee makeup and independence.
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In our sample of NZ listed firms during the 1997–2005 period, approximately 1/3 ap-
point their CEO to the compensation committee, while slightly less than 1/4 are excluded
from the board altogether. Relative to firm performance, CEOs in the former group are
generously rewarded, and are well insulated from poor performance. By contrast, firms in
the latter group receive compensation increments that are both less generous on average
and more sensitive to firm performance. Moreover, these differences appear to matter
for subsequent firm performance – the greater the predicted quantity of CEO pay growth
attributable to formal CEO involvement in the pay-setting process, the lower are future
firm stock returns over one-, three- and five-year horizons. Overall, these results provide
evidence that differences in the extent of formal CEO participation in the pay-setting
process can have real economic consequences.
In the next section, we describe our data sources and properties. Section 3 con-
tains our results linking CEO pay outcomes to participation in the pay-setting process,
while section 4 considers the impact of such participation on subsequent firm performance.
Finally, section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Data
Our initial sample consists of companies listed on the NZ Stock Exchange (NZX) between
1997 and 2005. We begin in 1997 because NZ firms were not required to disclose executive
compensation details prior to that time.2 Compensation and governance information come
from a hand-collected dataset obtained from company annual reports. Older reports were
obtained from the annual reports collection in the now-defunct Commerce Resource Li-
brary at Otago University; more recent report information comes from the NZX Company
Research database. Stock return data, including adjustment factors, were sourced from
the Otago University Sharemarket Database, with supplementation from NZX. In each
year, firms were excluded from the sample if (i) there was missing information, (ii) they
were only listed on the secondary board, (iii) they delisted during the year, or (iv) the
CEO was not in office for the entire current and previous year. The final sample consists
of 502 firm-year observations for 114 different NZX firms over the nine year period be-
tween 1997 and 2005. With 55 such observations in 1997, this leaves 447 ‘first-difference’
observations over the sample period.
We focus on what Newman and Mozes (1999) call ‘firm-awarded’ compensation,
i.e., remuneration that is under the direct control of the firm. This has two components:
(i) salary, bonus and allowances, and (ii) new stock and option grants. NZ annual reports
directly provide, in a manner to be described below, data on the first component. They
also report information on any stock or option grants made during the year, which in
2See Andjelkovic et al.(2002) for details of the legislative change and surrounding controversy.
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principle allows estimation of the second. However, stock and option awards occur infre-
quently in NZ firms during the sample period (11% of firm-years) and are of minor value
(approximately 6.4% of the value of component (i) for the firms where we are able to value
option grants). Moreover, 36 option grants in our sample are unable to be valued due
to insufficient information being reported. Given the relatively low importance of such
grants in NZ, we avoid any further reduction in sample size by henceforth confining our
attention to component (i). We examine the importance of this restriction in section 3
NZ compensation disclosure requires that the sum of salary, bonus, superannuation,
health insurance coverage, and motor vehicle allowance be reported in the following ways.
For executives who are members of the board of directors, the exact value of this remu-
neration appears in a separate table of the annual report. For other employees, individual
details are not reported, only the number of workers receiving remuneration lying within
each $10,000 interval over and above $100,000 per annum. Consequently, we record com-
pensation for any CEO not on the board of directors as being equal to the midpoint of
the highest payment band.3 For example, if the CEO is not a member of the board of
directors and the maximum remuneration band in the annual report is $150,000-160,000,
then CEO compensation for that firm-year is estimated to be $155,000.4
For each firm–year, we collect performance and governance data. To proxy for
performance, we employ two measures. First, the firm’s one-year market-adjusted stock
return — the difference between the firm’s stock return over the year and the aggregate
stockmarket return (calculated using the broad-based All Ordinaries Index). Second,
because the relatively small and illiquid nature of NZ capital markets means that NZ
firms may reward factors other than stock market performance, we also use the firm’s
one-year return on assets (ROA) – the ratio of after-tax profit to total assets. We also
record the extent of the CEO’s formal involvement in the pay-setting process: a member of
the compensation committee as well as the board (157 firm-years), a member of the board
only (186), not a board member (104). CEOs who sit on the compensation committee
might be expected to have a particularly strong influence on the compensation process,
while those who are excluded from the board may be in the opposite situation.
Some summary statistics for various pay and performance variables appear in Table
1. Across the whole sample, firms on average achieve an annual stock return of 17%,
while CEOs receive compensation that grows by 11.34% per annum. By contrast, the
average ROA is a miserable -16%, an outcome that is largely due to a sizable number
of asset write-downs during the middle part of our sample period. More interesting are
the differences between the three categories of formal CEO involvement in the pay-setting
3Exceptions to this rule occasionally occur when when there are identifiable employees who receive
special retirement or redundancy payments that take them into the top band.
4All monetary values in this paper are expressed in NZ dollars.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table reports means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for pay and performance
measures from listed New Zealand firms between 1997 and 2005. Raw stock return is the
annual percentage change in firm value; market-adjusted stock return is raw stock return
minus the return on the market index; ROA is after-tax profits divided by total assets.
Annual compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, superannuation, health insurance coverage,
and motor vehicle allowance. The first column reports statistics based on all firm-years
appearing in the sample, while the remaining columns focus on three subsets: CEOs who sit
on the board of directors, but not the compensation committee, CEOs who sit on both the
board and the compensation committee, and CEOs who sit on neither.
All Firms CEO on CEO on CEO not
Board Compensation on Board
Committee
(N = 447) (N = 186) (N = 157) (N = 104)
Performance
Raw stock return 16.71 19.03 10.89 21.33
(%) (48.7) (44.8) (52.9) (48.3)
Market-adjusted 5.85 7.47 1.17 10.01
stock return (%) (45.5) (41.3) (50.2) (44.9)
ROA (%) −15.90 0.18 −48.01 3.80
(224.3) (68.6) (369.4) (14.0)
Compensation
Annual CEO 439.23 534.98 388.81 344.10
compensation ($000) (318.2) (369.1) (280.0) (231.5)
Annual change in 11.34 14.72 8.60 9.42
CEO compensation (%) (22.2) (24.9) (20.9) (17.9)
process. CEOs who sit on the compensation committee receive the lowest annual growth in
compensation, but the firms they lead also perform significantly less well. Indeed, the pay
differences are small relative to the performance differences, suggesting that CEOs who
sit on the compensation committee may be successful in decoupling their pay from firm
performance. At the other end of the scale, CEOs who are not on the board lead the best-
performing firms, but receive relatively little reward for doing so. Both these observations
suggest that formal CEO participation in the pay-setting process can influence the eventual
outcome. In order to shed more light on this issue, we must estimate the link between pay
and performance for each of the different classes of firm, a task to which we now turn.
3 Results
CEOs who sit on their own compensation committees have the potential to advance their
own interests at the expense of stockholders, either by achieving greater overall pay, or
by decoupling their pay from firm performance in a self-beneficial manner, or both. Even
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when such CEOs are excluded from discussions relating to their own remuneration, their
compensation committee membership can still be advantageous: for example, by the ne-
gotiation of favorable pay structures and packages for their subordinate executives – which
then need to be passed on to CEOs in order to maintain ‘relativity’. By contrast, CEOs
who are excluded from the board altogether would seem to have little ability to influence
the pay-setting process in their favor.
To investigate the possibility that greater CEO involvement in the pay-setting pro-
cess has implications for compensation structure, we regress annual CEO pay increments
on firm performance and allow for different intercept and slope coefficients reflecting the
extent of CEO involvement. Because NZ firms are relatively small, we estimate the pay-
performance sensitivity in elasticity form so as to counter the observed tendency for the
dollar sensitivity to decline with firm size – see, for example, Jensen and Murphy (1990),
Gibbons and Murphy (1992), and Schaefer (1998). Thus, our regression models have the
general form:
∆Pay = α0 + α1R + α2DH + α3DL + α4(DH ∗R) + α5(DL ∗R) +  (1)
where:
∆Pay = annual change in the natural log of CEO pay;
R = annual firm performance, defined either as ROA or as the natural log of
(firm value/stock market index);
DH = 1 if the CEO sits on the compensation committee and 0 otherwise;
DL = 1 if the the CEO does not sit on the board of directors and 0 otherwise.
In equation (1), α1 is the performance-related growth in pay for CEOs who are on the
board, but not the compensation committee; α4 and α5 represent the incremental effects of
being on the compensation committee and not being on the board respectively. Similarly,
α0 is the component of pay growth that is unrelated to performance for board-only CEOs,
and α2 and α3 are the corresponding incremental effects associated with the other two sub-
groups. Our primary interest is in the estimates of these incremental-variable coefficients.
The results obtained from estimating equation (1) appear in Table 2. All reported
models also include a full set of time dummies (1998 being the excluded year), and because
some CEOs appear in the data multiple times we estimate robust standard errors that
allow for clustering at the firm level. In the first two columns, we suppress the dummy
variables DH and DL and include only firm performance as an explanatory variable. The
resulting coefficient estimates are statistically significant (at the 1% level for the stock
market measure and at the 7% level for ROA), but are economically small compared to
those previously obtained from US data. For example, three representative US-based
studies that estimate the elasticity form of the pay-stockmarket performance sensitivity
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– Murphy (1985), Hall and Liebman (1998) and Zhou (1999) – report estimates ranging
from 0.16 to 0.23, two to three times the NZ value. A lower average sensitivity is what
would be expected if the sub-group of CEOs on the compensation committee behave
opportunistically to divorce their remuneration from firm performance.
Table 2: Pay, Performance and CEO Influence: Regression Results
The dependent variable is the annual change in the natural logarithm of CEO pay. Firm
performance is either the annual change in the natural logarithm of firm value minus the
annual change in the natural logarithm of the stock market index (‘Market’ columns) or the
ratio of after-tax profits to total assets (‘ROA’ columns). All regressions include a full set
of year dummies (1998 being the omitted year). Terms in parentheses are p-values based on
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Firm Performance Measure
Market ROA Market ROA Market ROA
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 0.107 0.108 0.131 0.140 0.139 0.140
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm performance 0.079 0.006 0.122 0.045 0.122 0.045
(0.01) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CEO on Compensation −0.042 −0.055 −0.084 −0.070
Committee (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
CEO not on Board −0.040 −0.062 −0.044 −0.038
of Directors (0.04) (0.00) (0.04) (0.20)
Firm performance −0.074 −0.042
*CEO on Compensation (0.23) (0.00)
Committee
Firm performance −0.057 0.228
*CEO not on Board (0.38) (0.03)
Firm performance ≥ 0 0.103 0.218
*CEO on Compensation (0.19) (0.39)
Committee
Firm performance < 0 −0.164 −0.042
*CEO on Compensation (0.06) (0.00)
Committee
Firm performance ≥ 0 −0.033 −0.097
*CEO not on Board (0.74) (0.78)
Firm performance < 0 −0.069 0.329
*CEO not on Board (0.50) (0.00)
R2 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.05
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The third and fourth columns in Table 2 explores this idea more directly by esti-
mating the full version of equation (1), i.e., with separate coefficient estimates conditioned
on CEO involvement in the pay-setting process. This modification reveals some interest-
ing phenomena. First, the estimated intercept coefficients are significantly lower for both
CEOs who are on the compensation committee and those who are not on the board at
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all, consistent with both groups having a larger fraction of their average pay increments
linked to firm performance in some way. Second, for CEOs who are on the board but not
the compensation committee (the typical US situation), the estimated sensitivity of pay
to stock market performance is 0.122, much closer to the US-based estimates noted above.
Third, the estimated sensitivity of CEO pay to ROA (but not to stock market returns)
is significantly lower for CEOs who sit on the compensation committee and significantly
higher for CEOs who are excluded from the board altogether. These latter differences
are economically large: the average pay-performance sensitivity of CEOs who sit on the
compensation committee is essentially zero, while those who are excluded from the board
have an average sensitivity that is approximately five times as great as those who are
board members.5 Thus, high- and low-influence CEOs appear to face very different levels
of exposure to firm accounting performance.6
More detailed insights into the differences between the three groups can be obtained
by considering some quantitative implications of Table 2. First, to highlight ‘excess’
expected pay differences between the three categories of formal CEO involvement, we set
R equal to its respective sample mean for each category, calculate the pay growth predicted
by columns (3) or (4) of Table 2, and then subtract the corresponding mean value of R.
Second, we compare the performance sensitivities of each category by calculating the
change in predicted pay growth resulting from a common performance shock (plus or
minus one standard deviation of the corresponding performance measure). Finally, as we
are primarily interested in the ‘incremental’ effect of high or low participation in the pay-
setting process, we normalise each category’s value of these statistics by the corresponding
value for the CEO-on-board category.
The results of these exercises appear in Table 3. Compared to CEOs who sit only
on the board, CEOs who are also compensation committee members receive annual pay
increments that are up to four times more generous relative to average performance, and
only 39-45% as sensitive to fluctuations in firm performance. By contrast, the average
non-board CEO obtains annual pay increments that are only half as generous relative
to average performance and are more sensitive to fluctuations in firm ROA (but not to
fluctuations in market-adjusted stock returns).
In summary, the impression created by Tables 2 and 3 is that, relative to ‘normal’-
participation CEOs (i.e., those who sit on the board but not the compensation committee)
(i) high-involvement CEOs obtain annual pay rewards that have high mean (at least
relative to the performance of such firms) and low performance-sensitivity, and (ii) low-
5For the stock return performance measure, the sensitivity differences across the three groups are
economically large, but very imprecisely estimated.
6The overall explanatory power of these models – as measured by R2 – is low, suggesting that relatively
little of the total variation in CEO pay can be attributed to performance issues. This is similar to the
findings of Jensen and Murphy (1990), Schaefer (1998) and Zhou (1999).
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involvement CEOs receive pay increments that have low mean and high performance-
sensitivity.7
To investigate these issues further, we re-estimate equation (1) allowing for differ-
ent performance coefficients in good- and bad-performance states. For rational, risk-averse
executives, a lower sensitivity of pay to performance is strictly attractive only when firm
performance is poor; when performance is strong, CEOs will prefer as high a sensitivity as
possible. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 2 reveal two striking asymmetries of exactly this
kind, particularly for the more precisely-estimated ROA-based models. First, the incre-
mental effect of compensation committee membership on the pay-performance sensitivity
is significantly negative when returns are negative, but is insignificantly different from
zero when returns are positive. Summing the point estimates in column (6), CEOs who
sit on the compensation committee receive on average an extra 0.263 percentage point pay
increment for every additional percentage point of positive ROA, but the corresponding
penalty for negative ROA is only 0.003 percentage points. This result provides further
evidence that compensation committee membership may allow CEOs to reap the benefits
of good performance while avoiding the costs of poor performance.
Second, CEOs who do not sit on the board find themselves in the opposite position:
the incremental effect of board exclusion on the pay-performance sensitivity is significantly
positive when returns are negative, but is insignificantly different from zero when returns
are positive. That is, compared to CEOs with a seat on the board, non-board CEOs are
penalized for poor performance but receive no additional reward for good performance.
Thus, having no input at all into the pay-setting process may be a significant disadvantage
when it comes to negotiating remuneration.8
One possible problem with these results is that they may be due to within-sample
correlation between the extent of formal CEO involvement in the pay-setting process and
other firm attributes that have an effect on compensation structure. For example, Holm-
strom and Milgrom (1987) show, with supporting evidence from Aggarwal and Samwick
(1999), that the optimal sensitivity of pay to performance is a decreasing function of firm
risk – if the firm is high risk, then realised firm performance is a noisy indicator of CEO
effort and high-powered incentives are economically inefficient. Similarly, John and John
7We also experimented with other specifications. For example, a small number of CEOs on occasions
attend meetings of the compensation committee despite not being committee members, so we re-defined
DH using this ‘de facto’ measure of involvement. We also tried using the firm’s raw stock return as an
alternative measure of firm performance. None of these adjustments had any significant impact on our
results.
8As noted in the discussion of Table 1, the average ROA of our sample firms is low due to a proliferation
of asset write-downs during the middle part of our sample period. When the firm-years corresponding to
the most extreme write-downs are excluded, some of the coefficient estimates in Table 2 become larger
and/or more precisely estimated, some become smaller and/or less precisely estimated, but the overall
tenor of our results is unaffected.
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Table 3: CEO pay and participation in the pay-setting process: Quantitative evidence
This table provides, for the average CEO in each pay-setting participation group, some quan-
titative implications of the results in column (2) of Table 2. Column (1) reports the difference
between ∆Pay and firm performance for each incremental participation level, normalised by
the corresponding difference for CEOs who are board members. So the first cell in column
(1) indicates that, on average, CEOs who have membership of the compensation committee
achieve 39% more ‘excess’ annual pay growth than do CEOs who sit only on the board.
Column (2) reports the absolute value of a one standard deviation change in performance on
annual pay growth for each incremental participation level, normalised by the corresponding
value for CEOs who are board members.
‘Excess’∆Pay Sensitivity
Market ROA Market ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO on compensation committee 1.394 3.962 0.390 0.452
CEO not on board 0.457 0.494 0.529 1.230
(1993) show that the optimal sensitivity is a decreasing function of firm leverage due to
the risk-shifting incentives induced by debt. Thus, if either risk or leverage is significantly
correlated in our sample with CEO participation in the pay-setting process, then some of
our results above may be spurious.
To assess this possibility, we estimate firm risk as the annualised standard deviation
of stock returns over the previous five years and leverage as the ratio of debt book value
to the sum of debt book value and equity market value.9 Note that due to the non-
independence of annual observations from the same firm, we calculate and compare these
variables at the firm level. For example, the leverage observation for a firm that is in
our sample for the six years from 1998 to 2004 is calculated as the average of that firm’s
leverage over those six years. If the firm changes categories during that period (e.g.,
from having its CEO on the compensation committee to not), then a separate calculation
is made for each category. We then compare the median values (preliminary analysis
indicated the presence of skewness) of these two variables for each of the three categories
of CEO involvement in the pay-setting process.
Table 4 contains the results of this exercise. Relative to firms in which the CEO
sits on the board only, firms that appoint their CEO to the compensation committee have
slightly higher risk while firms whose CEO is not on the board have slightly lower risk.
However, these differences are economically and statistically insignificant. Differences in
leverage are greater, but both high and low participation groups have significantly lower
leverage. That is, their leverage choices differ from those of the board-only participation
9Estimating firm risk as the annualised standard deviation of ROA over the previous five years, or
using equity book value in the calculation of leverage, yields virtually identical results to those appearing
in Table 4.
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Table 4: Volatility, leverage and CEO participation in the pay-setting process
For each category of CEO participation in the pay-setting process, this table reports medians
for two variables known to affect the structure of CEO remuneration. Volatility is the
annualised standard deviation of stock returns over the previous five years; Leverage is the
ratio of debt book value to the sum of debt book value and equity market value. Both
variables are calculated at the firm level as an average over the years the firm appears in the
sample. Terms in parentheses are Mann-Whitney p-values for a test of the hypothesis that
the median value in the corresponding participation category is the same as in the ‘normal’
participation category.
CEO on CEO on CEO not
Board Compensation on Board
Committee
(N = 62) (N = 60) (N = 27)
Volatility 0.359 0.377 0.324
(0.51) (0.49)
Leverage 0.483 0.400 0.303
(0.09) (0.06)
group in the same direction, whereas the results in Tables 2 and 3 indicate that their
remuneration structures differ in opposite directions. Thus, it seems unlikely that our
principal results above can be attributed to differences in volatility or leverage.10
Finally in this section, we consider the possibility that our results are at least
partly an artifact of our focus on cash, as opposed to total, compensation. It could be, for
example, that our finding of a significantly negative pay-performance sensitivity in low-
return states for CEOs who sit on their firm’s compensation committee is driven by the
subset of firms that also award equity-based remuneration to their CEOs. For such firms,
the cash pay-performance sensitivity will substantially understate the full effects of low
returns on CEO remuneration, and thus the estimated negative coefficient may provide
a misleading picture of the true incentives faced by CEOs. We therefore re-estimate the
models appearing in Table 2 using the sub-sample of firms that never pay equity-based
remuneration during the period covered by our data, i.e., the group of firms that pay only
cash compensation. If our earlier results are simply the result of low cash pay-performance
sensitivities in firms that also provide equity-based remuneration, then the same patterns
should not show up in the ‘cash-only’ sub-sample. However, the results obtained from
using this sub-sample are very similar to those appearing in Table 2: although some
coefficients are less precisely estimated than previously due to the smaller sample sizes,
our principal results are unaffected – CEOs who sit on the compensation committee are
10In unreported regressions, we include volatility and leverage as additional explanatory variables in our
earlier models, but, unsurprisingly in the light of Table 4, this has little effect on the results reported in
Table 2.
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treated generously relative to performance, and have a lower pay-performance sensitivity,
particularly in low-return states. Thus, our results do not seem to be due to CEO pay
mis-measurement.
4 Endogeneity, self-selection and subsequent firm per-
formance
We have thus far assumed that CEO involvement in the pay-setting process is exogenous,
but this may not be the case. For example, the level of CEO involvement may be chosen by
firms on the basis of perceived CEO talent or ability. In this case, the apparently generous
treatment of CEOs who sit on their firms’ compensation committee may simply indicate
an equilibrium response to a more difficult or complex job. Alternatively, CEOs of firms
that are expected to perform poorly may demand both a more attractive remuneration
package and greater powers and responsibilities, including board and committee seats, as
compensation for the greater risk. In this case, the results above may be evidence only of
optimal contracting by risk-averse CEOs.
To address these issues, we undertake two additional sets of tests. First, to check
the possibility that the CEO involvement dummies DH and DL are simply proxying for
some unobservable aspect of CEO ability, we follow the two-stage procedure of Core et
al (1999) in which subsequent firm performance is related to the component of CEO pay
growth associated with the level of formal CEO involvement in the pay-setting process.
More specifically, the first stage consists of using the estimated coefficients from models
(5) and (6) in Table 3 to compute:
formal-involvement pay growth = αˆ2DH + αˆ3DL + αˆ4(DH ∗R ≥ 0)
+ αˆ5(DH ∗R < 0) + αˆ6(DL ∗R ≥ 0)
+ αˆ7(DL ∗R < 0) (2)
The second stage then involves estimating
subsequent firm = β0 + β1(formal-involvement pay growth) + φX+ µ (3)
performance
where subsequent firm performance is the average market-adjusted stock return for the
one-, three-, or five-year period following the year in which compensation is received, and
X is a vector of control variables that potentially affect subsequent firm performance. For
the latter, we employ the same set of variables as used by Core et al: risk – equal to the
standard deviation of the firm’s annual stock returns over the five-year period prior to the
award of compensation; size – equal to the firm’s stock market value in the year prior to
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the receipt of compensation; and the market-to-book ratio prevailing at the end of the
year immediately prior to the awarding of compensation.11
The idea underlying this two-step procedure is that equation (2) calculates the
predicted level of CEO pay growth directly attributable to formal CEO involvement in
the pay-setting process. If greater involvement allows CEOs to benefit themselves at the
expense of stockholders, then this variable should be negatively associated with the firm’s
subsequent stock market performance, i.e., our estimate of β1 in equation (3) should be
negative. On the other hand, if greater CEO involvement is merely proxying for a more
complex job and hence for higher equilibrium remuneration, then the β1 estimate should
be zero or positive.
In applying equation (2), we use both the ROA and market-adjusted stock return
measures of R. For each resulting computation of involvement-based pay growth, we then
estimate equation (3) over each of the three performance periods and report the results
in Table 5. Both short-term (one-year) and medium-term (three-year) subsequent firm
performance are negatively related to the formal-involvement component of pay growth at
at least the 3% significance level, regardless of whether ROA or stock market returns are
used to compute the formal-involvement pay growth variable. Quantitatively, a one stan-
dard deviation increase in formal-involvement pay growth lowers subsequent performance
by approximately 4% per year on average. The five-year performance case is more ambigu-
ous: for formal-involvement pay growth computed from ROA, there is again a strongly
significant negative relationship, but the relationship between five-year performance and
the stock return version of formal-involvement pay growth is, while negative and of similar
magnitude, statistically insignificant at conventional levels.
Overall, the results in Table 5 indicate that the portion of CEO pay growth at-
tributable to formal CEO involvement in the pay-setting process has a significantly ad-
verse effect on subsequent firm performance. This provides further evidence that CEO
board and compensation committee membership is indicative of CEO self-interest, and is
not, for example, simply proxying for CEO ability.
Finally, we examine the possibility that our results are an artifact of self-selection by
risk-averse CEOs. For this, we use the two-stage model of Heckman (1979), in which the
first stage estimates two selection equations for the choice of CEO participation in the pay-
setting process (one each for the high- and low-influence categories), and the second stage
uses the inverse Mills ratios generated by the first stage models as additional exogenous
variables in the regression equation given by (1).12 That is, the second stage estimates
11We also include a full set of year dummies, with 1998 being the omitted year.
12See Li and Prabhala (2007) for a detailed discussion of applications of the Heckman procedure in
corporate finance.
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Table 5: CEO Involvement in the Pay-Setting Process and Subsequent Firm Performance
The dependent variable is the average market-adjusted stock return for the one-, three-, or
five-year period following the year in which compensation is received. Involvement-based pay
growth is the predicted level of CEO pay growth directly attributable to CEO involvement
in the pay-setting process, and is computed from models (5) and (6) in Table 3 as:
involvement-based pay growth = αˆ2DH + αˆ3DL + αˆ4(DH ∗R ≥ 0) + αˆ5(DH ∗R < 0)
+ αˆ6(DL ∗R ≥ 0) + αˆ7(DL ∗R < 0)
In columns (1)-(3) below, R is ROA; in columns (4)-(6), R is the annual change in the
natural logarithm of firm value minus the annual change in the natural logarithm of the
stock market index. Risk is the standard deviation of the firm’s annual stock returns over
the five-year period prior to the award of compensation. Size is the firm’s stock market value
and market-to-book is the firm’s ratio of market value to book value, both measured at the
end of the year immediately prior to the awarding of compensation All regressions include
a full set of year dummies (1998 being the omitted year). Terms in parentheses are p-values
based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Measure of R used in equation (2)
ROA ROA ROA Market Market Market
Duration of subsequent firm performance
1-year 3-year 5-year 1-year 3-year 5-year
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 0.017 −0.475 −0.213 −0.025 −0.527 −0.274
(0.93) (0.11) (0.61) (0.90) (0.08) (0.53)
Involvement-based −0.511 −0.463 −0.472 −1.346 −1.647 −1.411
pay growth (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02) (0.14)
Risk −0.317 −0.377 −0.823 −0.294 −0.348 −0.776
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Size 0.014 0.043 0.036 0.015 0.044 0.038
(0.35) (0.05) (0.25) (0.31) (0.04) (0.22)
Market-to-book −0.010 −0.013 −0.017 −0.009 −0.011 −0.015
(0.24) (0.18) (0.17) (0.27) (0.18) (0.22)
R2 0.10 0.14 0.23 0.10 0.15 0.23
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 437 394 241 437 394 241
the model:
∆Pay = α0 + α1R + α2DH + α3DL + α4(DH ∗R) + α5(DL ∗R)
+α6λ+ α7γ + η (4)
where:
λ = DHλ1 + (1−DH)λ2,
and λ1 and λ2 are the inverse Mills ratios corresponding, respectively, to the CEO being
on and not being on the compensation committee; and
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γ = DLγ1 + (1−DL)γ2,
and γ1 and γ2 are the inverse Mills ratios corresponding, respectively, to the CEO being
on and not being on the board.
Because the results from estimating equation (4) reinforce those appearing in section
3, we do not tabulate them. Nevertheless, it is worth noting the principal findings. First,
both λ and γ have coefficient estimates that are statistically significant at the 5% level or
better in some specifications, suggesting that self-selection effects are potentially important
in explaining the relationship between CEO pay and influence. Second, however, this has
no effect on the estimated coefficients for the CEO-involvement variables. Indeed, some of
the regression variables of interest become more economically and statistically significant
following the inclusion of the self-selection variables. For example, in column (3) of Table 2,
the α3 estimate becomes −0.253 with a p-value of 0.01, compared with the original values
of -0.04 and 0.04 respectively. Thus, accounting for self-selection appears, if anything,
to provide even stronger support for our conclusions concerning the differences in pay
structures across the three CEO participation categories.
5 Concluding Remarks
Much has been written about executive compensation, but surprisingly little is known
about how this is affected by formal CEO involvement in the pay-setting process. We
examine this issue using data from New Zealand, where there exists considerable variation
in the extent of formal CEO involvement. We find that: (i) the average pay-performance
sensitivity is relatively low in New Zealand, (ii) the sensitivity is lower in low-return years
for CEOs who sit on the compensation committee, thus insulating them from poor firm
performance, (iii) CEOs who do not sit on the board of directors are paid less generously
on average and face a performance sensitivity that is higher in low-return years, and
(iv) subsequent performance is weaker in firms where the predicted component of pay
growth attributable to CEO involvement in the pay-setting process is high. Although
any one part of this evidence is not necessarily compelling, together they form a picture
of greater CEO involvement being associated with pay structures that benefit the CEO
and hurt the stockholders. A potential implication is that jurisdictions which discourage
CEO membership of the compensation committee and board may be better positioned to
maximize stockholder wealth
Our focus has been on the implications of a particular governance arrangement for
the efficiency of CEO pay structures. Another issue of interest is the effect of this arrange-
ment on firm investment and performance. Does, for example, CEO membership of the
compensation committee, and the consequent ability to insulate one’s remuneration from
firm performance, encourage the taking on of riskier investment projects and, hence, result
14
in more volatile firm performance? And perhaps more fundamentally, what determines
the firm’s choice of CEO involvement in the board and compensation committee in the
first place? Although such questions are beyond the scope of this paper, they may well be
worthy of further research.
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